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2Chapter 1
Introduction
The current literature on empirical development economics contains a vigorous debate as regards
the variety of approaches to understanding the development paradigm. Economic and regulatory
policies, human and physical resources, and governance are all seen as drivers of economic
development and yet there is no agreement on the exact roles each play in driving development.
The fundamental puzzle retains two questions: Do the quality of one of these factors matter more
for sustained economic growth and development? Is it the case that their relative importance is
homogenous across countries and stages of development?
One strand of development economics contends that a combination of a stable macro-economy
with market and investment climate-friendly set of economic policies is the necessary and suﬃ-
cient condition for economic growth, which then drives other concepts of development, such as
living standards and health outcomes. This view is associated with the Washington Consensus,
which was the dominant paradigm of the 1980s and 1990s. It is under this consensus that mul-
tilateral lending agencies advised successive developing country governments on the need to ﬁx
budgets, cut inﬂation, and watch the economy take oﬀ with the dynamism of its private busi-
nesses. The experience of various countries, especially in Latin America that followed structural
reforms to heart and yet ended up with sub-par growth performance in the 1990s however was a
crude blow to this approach. This prompted even the World Bank, one of the proponents of the
Washington Consensus to focus beyond stable macro-economic conditions and business-friendly
reforms, as it did on its report on the growth experience of the 1990s.
A rival strand, which goes back to Gerschenkron’s theories on backwardness, believes in the
context-speciﬁc and more subtle nature of development. Recent proponents contend that in-
stitutions matter, and well-governed countries are likely to grow faster, be more eﬀective in
alleviating poverty, and are also likely to be more successful in creating equitable growth and
redistribution. A radical strand of this approach is one taken by Rodrik, Hausmann and Velasco,
as the authors deviate signiﬁcantly from a model of growth that speciﬁes a nature of homogeneity
in reforms to catalyze growth. Their growth diagnostics approach attempts to identity binding
constraints, which are notions of the most important areas where reforms can bring the largest
and quickest beneﬁts. In this framework, improving trade barriers can either strongly acceler-
ate the growth process; or have no impact on growth trends at all, depending on the need of
the economy at the hour. The binding constraint of an economy hence dictates how successful
particular reforms are.
Empirical work on development macroeconomics has not been able to converge on one strand
or another. Initial theoretical and empirical work into growth accounting delivered results that
both trends in total factor productivity and capital accumulation (physical and human) have sig-
niﬁcant roles in driving growth, while productivity trends appear to be more important. These
results however move us no further in the above questions, because various economic policies,
governance eﬃciency and institutional quality all aﬀect trends in productivity and capital accu-
mulation. Without a strong macro-economic environment, it is hard to create signiﬁcant private
3investment. Rampant corruption mostly goes along with weak incentives for ﬁrms to compete
and hence to lower productivity growth. We can think of numerous other examples, but the
point remains; the question of relative impact of reforms in one dimension against another is
still very much left unanswered.
A large part of the problem is the inability of empirical macro-research to converge on methods
and techniques that can attribute causal eﬀects of interventions on outcomes. Traditionally,
OLS regression methods have been used on country cross-section data to study the links be-
tween macro policy/governance interventions and outcome variables. These methods have been
criticized for the lack of accuracy emanating from problems of omitted variable bias and en-
dogeneity, model uncertainty and heterogeneity. Researchers have attempted to solve some of
these problems by using instrumental variables approach, for example Acemoglu et al. (2001).
These studies are important steps towards estimating causal inference in cross-country studies
and yet problems remain. Strong external instruments are hard to ﬁnd, and even if they exist,
the eﬀect obtained from such regressions are limited to the variation that is aﬀected by the
instrument. These problems make the instrumental variables approach limited in its ability to
evaluate macro interventions. This has led some researchers to use dynamic panel data methods,
which account for endogeneity issues and yet other problems remain, such as the instability of
results from cross-country regressions when variables, time periods and countries in the data
change.
Our goal in this paper is not to attempt to resolve the two aforementioned questions in their en-
tirety. Such an endeavor requires a much larger and longer research agenda. We merely attempt
to identify speciﬁc cases of reforms in the disparate dimensions, ranging from macroeconomic and
debt dynamics to governance reforms in the last decade, and attempt to assess their impact on
development indicators such as economic growth. We do this by using recently developed meth-
ods of inference, which help us attribute with larger certainty the impact on outcome variables
to the interventions themselves. By selecting case studies where changes in one dimension were
not accompanied by changes in other dimensions, the paper provides a window of understanding
into whether reforms in certain dimensions aﬀected development outcomes by themselves or not.
We also perform robustness checks to see whether the results of these methods are sensitive to
minor modeling changes. We believe that by building a larger catalogue of such results, we can
attempt to start understanding the questions highlighted above.
In order to complete this task, we need to ﬁrst identify signiﬁcant large scale interventions in
policy and governance dimensions. Chapter II of the paper explains our methodology on how to
identify and measure large recent interventions on policy and governance dimensions. Chapter
III explains the methodology we use to understand how successful these interventions have been
in contributing towards development outcomes. We describe the results of the particular case




Before embarking on the identiﬁcation and measurement of interventions on the dimensions of
economic policy, institutions and governance, we attempt to deﬁne each of the terms clearly.
The deﬁnition of institutions has always been fraught with large problems. The early deﬁnition
by Douglas North was very broad, encompassing all "rules of the game" in a society. (North,
1991) Acemoglu characterizes the structure of property rights and the presence and perfection
of markets as the crucial economic institutions in a society. (Acemoglu, Chapter 6) Unlike
geography, economic and social institutions are endogenously determined by societies in the
long run. Acemoglu also posits the idea that the inability to clearly compare across institutional
frameworks has meant that the development literature focuses more on proximate determinants
of economic growth, which include policies.
Public policies, on the other hand, are rules set up, and discretionary actions taken within the
institutional structure to manage society, including its economy. These include rules on ﬁscal
budgets, exchange rate management, taxation, and in numerous other arenas. They also include
discretionary actions, for example ones taken during recessions to expand money supply, or
actions taken during wars to ration food and so forth. It is easy to see that the structure of
economic, political and social institutions aﬀect the choice of policies. Policies are also much
more volatile than institutions, and provide much larger variation in the data. Hence, empirical
literature tends to focus on the impact of policy diﬀerences on economic performance.
Governance is another concept that is harder to grasp at. The World Bank, in 2007, deﬁned
governance as "the manner in which public oﬃcials and institutions acquire and exercise the
authority to shape public policy and provide goods and services." This suggests the distinction
between policies and governance lies in the fact that policies are the rules and discretionary
actions, while governance is the concept of how well such rules and actions are shaped and
implemented. Examples of governance quality include the quality of budgetary management,
accountability, corruption control among others.
When a policy intervention takes place, the success of such an intervention depends not only on
the choice of the policy itself, but also on whether the governance quality in the particular case
is strong enough to allow the policy to work to its eﬀect. The underlying eﬀect of institutions
always remains, as both the choice of the policy and the quality of governance is shaped by the
institutional frameworks that characterize a society.
We believe that there has been much work on the importance of institutions in causing long
run diﬀerences in economic growth. (Acemoglu, Johnson, Robinson, 2001) Institutions can also
only be studied with an emphasis on the very long run. We thus focus our eﬀorts on the
evaluation of interventions on the policy and governance dimensions, while cognizant of the fact
that institutional underpinnings are always aﬀecting any results we come up with.
5In the ﬁrst two sections of the paper, we use the term ’intervention’ to generalize across inter-
ventions in all of the dimensions we are interested in. It is only when we get down to the speciﬁc
case studies that we distinguish between interventions in various dimensions.
2.1 How to identify large interventions?
Understanding the impact of interventions on outcomes such as levels of income or corruption
is a diﬃcult and yet important task. The ﬁrst step in fulﬁlling such a task accurately is the
speciﬁcation of variables that identify interventions on a large scale. This is no trivial task, as
most measures used in the literature fail to make the distinction between intervention inputs
and intervention outputs.
When a government launches an anti-corruption drive, or changes its exchange rate manage-
ment strategy, these are intervention inputs. These intervention inputs are then mapped onto
intervention outputs, which are, for example, the levels of corruption after the launch of the
anti-corruption drive. This mapping depends not only on the choice of the right input, but also
on random shocks that can map bad intervention inputs into great outputs, or vice versa. This
is the central reason why the measurement of intervention inputs is so critical to understand the
eﬀect of interventions on outcomes such as income levels and growth.
On a separate note, the identiﬁcation and measurement of intervention, however, needs to also
avoid looking at de jure codiﬁcation of laws on policy and institutional matters. A law that
codiﬁes bribery as illegal is not enough to suggest that the government has implemented an anti-
corruption program. Ratings that meet these criteria should not be measuring legal statutes
that do not hold.
We believe that the Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA) ratings provided by
the World Bank for the IDA borrower countries meets both the criteria described earlier. Hence,
we use it to identify national-level reforms and thus understand the links between large scale
interventions and development outcomes. We note that this restricts our sample to International
Development Association (IDA) countries only.
2.2 CPIA History and Methodology
Each year, the World Bank undertakes an assessment of a country’s policies and institutions,
also referred to as the Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA). The CPIA assesses
the quality of a country’s present policy and institutional framework. "Quality" refers to how
conducive that framework is to fostering poverty reduction, sustainable growth, and the eﬀective
use of development assistance.
The Bank initiated country assessments in the late 1970s to help guide the allocation of IDA
lending resources. The CPIA consists of a set of criteria representing the diﬀerent policy and
institutional dimensions of an eﬀective poverty reduction and growth strategy. The criteria have
evolved over time, reﬂecting lessons learned and mirroring the evolution of the development
paradigm. In 1998, the criteria were substantially revised: coverage was expanded to include
governance and social policies, the number of criteria was set at 20 (where it remained until
2004), and the ratings scale was changed from a 5 to a 6 point scale. In the context of the
Board deliberations on CPIA disclosure, in early 2004, the Bank assembled an external Panel to
review the ratings and methodology. This Panel concluded that the CPIA criteria focus on the
right set of issues and produce robust results, but it also found unnecessary overlap in some of
the criteria and outlined steps to address some methodological and process issues. This Panel
broadly supported the CPIA practice of rating implemented rather than intended policy actions,
and it strongly favored disclosure of the ratings for IDA-eligible countries.
6Revising the CPIA methodology to reﬂect this Panel’s recommendations involved the Regions,
Networks, and Central Departments. Some of the criteria were deleted and others were combined
and streamlined. As a result of these revisions, the 2004 CPIA and since then each annual
assessment consists of 16 criteria (see Box 1). In addition, statistical analysis at the time
corroborated earlier ﬁndings that informed the choice of the CPIA weights: it showed that
using statistically (principal components) derived weights for the CPIA would yield essentially
the same results as the equal weighting. An equal weighting procedure has, moreover, the
added advantage of simplicity and transparency. Accordingly, beginning with CPIA 2004, equal
weights are attached to each of the four clusters, a procedure that is broadly in line with the
earlier approach. The 16 CPIA criteria are grouped into four clusters: Economic Management,
Structural Policies, Policies for Social Inclusion and Equity, and Public Sector Management and
Institutions (Figure 2.1).
Figure 2.1: CPIA Ratings
2.3 Strengths of CPIA
The ﬁrst important strength of the CPIA ratings system is the fact that it is the only rating
system available that actually covers the whole gamut of important policy and governance di-
mensions in similar scales that are set by one institution. This provides natural advantages for
research, as we can compare the size of ratings changes in one scale to another without losing
much in the way of accuracy.
There are two other important strengths of the CPIA ratings system. Firstly, they are not
intended to measure de jure versions of policies and institutional frameworks only. There is no
inherent problem in attempting to assess the impact of de jure interventions. However, de jure
interventions are often disconnected from the implementation on the ground, and hence studying
their impact rarely provides a deeper understanding of how interventions can aﬀect development
outcomes. We are conﬁdent that the CPIA ratings do not suﬀer from this problem because
7analysts at the Bank are explicitly asked to look at evidence stronger than legal codiﬁcation
when assessing the CPIA ratings. Given that the process of rating involves constant back and
forth between various groups inside the organization, we are comfortable with the assessment
that the ratings measure more than de jure policy statutes.
On the ﬂip side, a ratings system that rates intervention inputs cannot, by deﬁnition, have the
exact same mapping as intervention outputs. For example, even with a strong past system of
public ﬁnances, a random shock such as a tsunami or an earthquake can ruin public ﬁnances. If
the ratings system is based mechanistically on the annual outcome of the state of public ﬁnances,
the ratings will decrease precipitously, although the policy environment has not worsened, and
ﬁnances themselves could recover quickly. The CPIA ratings system describes itself as set up
in a way to avoid this problem as well. It is much harder to assess this claim however, because
analysts would ﬁnd information that is separated from outcomes very hard to ﬁnd.
There is a safeguard even with such a problem. A 2007 report by the World Bank on the CPIA
distinguishes between naïve and subtle endogeneity. If analysts look at intervention outcomes
while informing themselves of the strength of policy/institutions, such endogeneity is subtle and
harder to avoid and test. However, the second form of endogeneity, the case where analysts
change ratings blindly in response to large and exogenous shocks, can be tested. The study ﬁnds
that weather and terms of trade shocks did not signiﬁcantly impact the ratings. Hence, we can




We now turn to the discussion of methods which can help estimate the actual impact of inter-
ventions on development outcomes.
The CPIA ratings can be used to empirically assess the eﬀect of particular changes in economic
policy or governance regimes on development outcomes of interest. The methodological problems
are however signiﬁcant, as policy outcomes get determined in an environment embedded by
social, political institutions and governance quality. Research can thus pursue two separate
methodological avenues, which we describe and assess.
3.1 Regression Methods with Dynamic Panel Data Models
The ﬁrst method uses classical regressions with dynamic panel data models which can estimate
the average eﬀect of particular interventions on development outcomes. Given that OLS and
ﬁxed eﬀects estimators are biased due to unobserved time-invariant country-speciﬁc eﬀects, and
the availability of external instruments that meet exclusion restrictions is weak, these estimators
have become central to the empirical growth literature. Bond et al. (2001) use the system GMM
estimators to account for the endogeneity of variables such as investment, and to remove time
invariant eﬀects.
There are some critical problems associated with the use of these methods in our context. Firstly,
there is no convergence in the literature on the functional form for capturing diﬀerential eﬀects
of particular policy interventions. Neither the augmented Solow/Ramsey nor the endogenous
growth models that are workhorses of modern macroeconomics really have institutional struc-
tures as endogenous parameters in the models. Till date, the role of institutions and even most
policy interventions is mostly seen in improving allocative eﬃciency, and hence increasing total
factor productivity, which is generally calculated as the residual from the regressions that are
based on the workhorse models. This creates a problem, as empirical papers generally use re-
duced form equations and lump various variables of policy and institutional quality on the right
hand side of the regression equations. Bhagwati and Srinivasan (1999) argue that cross-country
regressions are hence not the correct way to understand the impact of reforms (such as trade
liberalization) on growth outcomes, because they are not based on any strong theoretical models,
and have no description of the functional forms of the relationships between the dependent and
independent variables. Using more advanced methods such as system GMM estimators cannot
solve these problems.
Also signiﬁcantly, these models use cross-country variation in growth outcomes as predicted by
policy changes to estimate the average eﬀect of a particular policy/governance change on growth
outcomes. This, however, assumes that the relative importance of particular policy/governance
inputs is similar across the diversity of countries in the sample group. Here, outliers become
9problematic, as really weak (or really strong) interventions are the ones that aﬀect estimates the
most, thus biasing the average eﬀects to outliers.
Authors like Bhagwati and Srinivasan (1999) and Rodrik (2005) also argue that regression results
are dependent on period, country sample and variables chosen. This suggests a lack of stability
in the parameters estimated through the regressions. Levine and Renelt (1992) use extreme-
bounds analysis to show that the results from cross country regressions are sensitive to modeling
design and hence fragile. This problem points to a larger issue, which is related to a debate
on how the growth paradigm itself is imagined. If growth occurs through a certain process,
which is catalyzed by certain policy steps and institutional changes, and this process retains
some structural similarity across a myriad of cross-country and across-time experiences, then a
regression approach retains its viability. However, recent literature focuses on a highly context-
speciﬁc idea of development needs. For example, Hausmann et. al. argue that the binding
constraint of an economy might dictate how successful particular policy interventions are. In
such a situation, improving trade barriers can either strongly accelerate the growth process; or
have no impact on growth trends at all, depending on the need of the economy at the hour.
A cross-country regression basically ﬂattens out this useful variation and provides us with an
average eﬀect, which in this case, could describe something that is irrelevant to any one country’s
development needs. We believe this considerable list of problems is enough for us to eschew
the use of cross-country regressions in assessing the impact of large scale interventions. We
thus choose not to follow the system GMM approach, while noting of its ability in avoiding
endogeneity problems that OLS regressions face.
3.2 Comparative Case Studies with Synthetic Control Meth-
ods
Current literature on evaluation of interventions, until very recently, focused signiﬁcantly on
micro interventions, which are amenable to the use of Randomly Controlled Trials (RCTs). This
approach has yielded many signiﬁcant results, as well-designed and well-run experiments allow
the researcher to interpret the impact of interventions with a high certainty about causality. This
literature, which perhaps began with Kremer and Miguel’s pioneering work on de-worming, is
now used extensively in understanding questions such as the impact of classroom cameras on
teacher absenteeism, and the evaluation of free bed-net distribution programs. These develop-
ments are welcome, and yet the lack of opportunity in experimentation at the macro level makes
true RCTs close to impossible in the macro realm. This literature has however helped economists
focus on some important methodological questions and problems that are important to causal
inference, whether the subject be a micro or macro intervention.
The search for methods that allow rigorous analysis on aggregate outcomes such as growth has
led to considerable recent work in the comparative case-study literature. Card and Krueger
(1994) use the diﬀerences-in-diﬀerences method to estimate the eﬀect of policy changes, such
as US State minimum wage laws on employment outcomes. The method of matching units on
propensity scores is widely used in the micro-development literature. Bhagwati and Srinivasan
(1999) point out the fact that comparative case studies can be likely avenues to further the path
of empirical macro research, given the problems identiﬁed with cross-country regressions. In
this tradition, the synthetic control method, started by Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003) uses an
empirically rigorous design to estimate the eﬀect of aggregate interventions.
Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003) and Abadie, Diamond and Heinmeuller (2007) are two empirical
papers that use the synthetic control approach to understand the impact of large scale policy
interventions on outcome variables. In their 2003 paper, Abadie and Gardeazabal use the ap-
proach to estimate the impact of the Basque separatist movement on growth trends of the state.
The Abadie et. al. paper (2007) focuses on the estimation of tobacco sales trends in California
after the passage of Proposition 99, which made it harder to sell tobacco. At the heart of the
synthetic control method used in these papers is the idea that the eﬀect of a particular interven-
10tion can be empirically assessed only by comparison with the correct counterfactual, a concept of
how the unit would have behaved had the intervention not happened. In diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence
studies, the researcher is allowed the discretion of choosing the comparison group that mimics
the counterfactual. This leads to substantive ambiguity on whether the comparison group really
is an eﬀective counterfactual. (Duﬂo et al. 2003) The synthetic control method resolves this
problem.
The method ﬁrst divides data into a pre and post intervention period, intervention in this
case being a signiﬁcant policy/governance intervention that is reﬂected in a strong change in the
CPIA ratings. The method then creates a "synthetic" unit that resembles the treated unit (in this
case the country that goes through the policy/governance intervention) in the pre-intervention
period. This is achieved by using a weighted average of all other countries in the sample (donor
pool as in the matching literature). The weights are set, unlike in the diﬀerences-in-diﬀerences
approach, not by the researcher. Instead, the weights are chosen such that the synthetic country
mimics the pre-intervention income per capita path and other observable characteristics of the
country that undergoes the intervention. This method also safeguards against extrapolation
that plagues regression models, as long as it is not used for countries with extreme values for
observable characteristics.
After the synthetic unit is chosen, the method looks at the growth performance of the treated
country against the performance of the synthetic country after the intervention. The gap between
the two can be used to estimate the eﬀect of particular changes in policy/governance on the
evolution of growth outcomes of the particular country in question. Unlike in a panel regression
framework, this is not asking the question of whether particular policy changes have, on average,
positive/negative eﬀects on growth across all countries. Hence, it avoids some of the problems
of the ﬁrst method. It also helps research lead to context-speciﬁc understanding of the eﬀects of
policy/governance changes on growth outcomes.
The largest beneﬁt of the method however, is the fact that it can account for time variant country
characteristics as long as there are enough pre-treatment periods and the pre-intervention match
is strong. After evaluating both methods, we decide to use the synthetic control method, because
of its strength in helping create a counterfactual that can more accurately mimic the treated
unit, hence making causal inference more probable. Below, we motivate the method using a
simple model as shown by Abadie et. al.
3.2.1 Motivating Model: Technical Details
Abadie et. al. motivate the method by using a model, which we describe now. Let’s say we have
J+1 countries in our dataset, and country 1 is the one that undergoes reforms. Let Y n
it be the
level of income per capita for a country i at time t without reforms, and Yit be the level of income
per capita for country i at time t with reforms. Let’s say we have time periods t = 1,...,T0 as
the pre-reform periods, and t = T0 + 1,...,T as the post-reform periods. For the country which
undergoes reforms, the level of income per capita can also be given by Yit = Y n
it + αitDit,
where αit = Yit − Y n
it; and Dit = 1when t > T0,and 0 otherwise. For countries without reforms,
Yit = Y n
it
Now, we want to estimate how much faster/slower the country with reforms grew after the
reforms, which is given by the set α1t = α1T0+1,...1T for cases where t > T0. We know from
earlier that α1t = Yit − Y n
it
We can obviously observe the post-reform trend of the country with the reforms (Yit), hence we
need to estimate Y n
it, which is the income per capita trend of the country with the reforms had
the reforms not happened. We use a linear factor model for this estimation. Now, let’s say that
output per capita is determined by the following factor model:
Y n
it = αt + θtZi + λtµi + it
Here Y n
it is the income per capita of a certain country i, at time t. Now, αt are the time-variant
11but unit-invariant ﬁxed eﬀects that can be diﬀerenced out by taking time-dummies. Zi are the
observed variables that aﬀect income per capita, while µi are the unobserved variables that aﬀect
income per capita. it are the error terms with zero mean.
The synthetic controls method creates a control unit for each country by assigning a certain
weight to each country in the donor pool. There can be many such combinations of weights,
which is denoted by the vector V = (w2,w3,....,wJ+1) which includes many such synthetic
controls.
Abadie et. al. show that if there are weights where the weighted income per capita before
the intervention matches the real income per capita, and the weighted value of the observed
covariates matches the real values of the covariates before the intervention, then the size of the
bias in the diﬀerence between the post-intervention incomes for the real and the synthetic unit
go to zero as pre-intervention period increases. They also show that this result holds when we
have a close but imperfect match.












jZj = Z1 holds.
Abadie et. al. (2007) provide mathematically that in these cases, the biases created by time
variant country characteristics tend towards zero, as long as the pre-intervention period is long
enough, and the match between the pre-intervention trends are strong. We point the reader to
Abadie et. al (2007) who prove this point mathematically in Appendix B to their paper.
Now, the key is to ﬁnd weights such that the distance between the treated country and the
synthetic control unit in the pre-reform period in terms of both GDP per capita and predictors
of GDP per capita is as close to zero as possible. We use the Stata program provided by Abadie
et. al. to ﬁnd the best possible pre-reform matches for the country in each case study. For the
method to yield accurate results, there are certain necessary conditions, which we describe next.
3.3 Feasibility of Synthentic Control Case Studies
In order for an empirically rigorous case study that uses the synthetic controls method to eﬀec-
tively isolate the impact of certain interventions, the following broad criteria have to hold.
• Signiﬁcant Intervention - The intervention has to be signiﬁcant at the level of the unit of
treatment, which, in this case, is the country itself. This might be an obvious point, but it
is important. An anti-corruption program in a local municipality can be evaluated for its
eﬃciency, but our goal with this research program is to identify and analyze the impact of
various larger programs and policies. That can only be done if the intervention is done at
the national level, or done at a local unit that makes up a large part of the national unit.
• Sustained Intervention - The intervention has to be sustained through a signiﬁcant period
of time. If the intervention is repealed after a year or two, then the possibility of it aﬀecting
variables of interest becomes lower, and the analysis cannot detect any eﬀect.
• Absence of Signiﬁcant Exclusive Shocks - The eﬀect of the intervention can only be esti-
mated accurately if the period of intervention was not characterized by signiﬁcant shocks
that aﬀected the treated unit exclusively. In this case, let’s say for example that country X
underwent a signiﬁcant transparency reform program, while at the same time; a large civil
war broke out inside the country. It is impossible to isolate the eﬀects of the transparency
program given that conﬂict aﬀects production and allocation of resources. In a similar
vein, global business cycle shocks are not problematic to this endeavor if they aﬀect the
treated unit and the donor pool similarly. This can be tested and the donor pool can be
shrunk to meet this requirement as well.
• Non-Interference Across Units - The eﬀect of the intervention cannot have an eﬀect on the
untreated unit. In this research project, an intervention cannot have a large eﬀect on the
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then isolating the eﬀect of the intervention becomes much more diﬃcult.
• Signiﬁcant Pre-Treatment Period - The synthetic control approach uses the variation in the
pre-treatment period across the donor pool to create a synthetic control unit that mimics
the treated unit pre-intervention. The larger the pre-treatment period, the smaller are the
possible biases accruing due to unobservable time-variant unit characteristics.
• Convex Hull Criteria - For the approach to work, some weighted combination of untreated
units must be close to mimicking the treated unit before the intervention. If a unit is
very far from other units in terms of the observed variables of interest, then the synthetic
control method cannot give accurate predictions. Given this, the countries at the extreme
ends of the spectrum of observed characteristics are not ideal for this method.
• Donor Pool Criteria - The factor model that is used to estimate the synthetic control is a
linear model. Given that this model might not hold strongly over disparate regions with
a wide variety of characteristics, the donor pool may have to be restricted to regions with
some similarity in observable characteristics such that the linear factor model can be a
good approximation. Also, the donor pool needs to be restricted to states that did not
have very signiﬁcant changes in economic policy or institutional frameworks themselves.
As long as these conditions hold strongly, endogeneity of the intervention is not a problem. An
example of endogeneity is when the intervention happens because of the level of the variable
of interest, such as when an anti-corruption drive happens because corruption levels are high.
However, in such a case, by deﬁnition, the levels of corruption in the synthetic control unit
match with the levels in the treated unit before the drive. If the level of corruption led to the
drive, then it would have done so in the case of the synthetic control unit as well. If there exist
countries that had similar corruption levels (and other important characteristics), and did not
have a corruption drive, then this suggests the eﬀects of endogeneity are not what caused the
intervention.
3.4 Intervention Selection Methodology
Given these criteria, we use the following methodological process to select interventions. First,
we select cases through a simple mathematical formula. Here, we are using the CPIA ratings to
denote the changes in policy inputs and governance regimes. Hence, in order to meet condition
of signiﬁcant intervention, we select cases for whom at least one of the CPIA ratings changed
by a value of more than 1 between 2004 and 2009. Given that average of the variance across all
ratings is 0.45, we believe ratings changes greater than 1 are signiﬁcant. Secondly, in order to
meet condition of sustained intervention, we restrict the pool of countries by selecting countries
where ratings changes were sustained for a period of 4 years or more.
Given that the cases need to meet the requirement of an absence of signiﬁcant exclusive shocks,
we avoid looking at countries that experienced signiﬁcant exclusive shocks, including conﬂicts
during the period. If an economy is signiﬁcantly reforming both its constitutional structure and
macro-economic policy at the same time, it becomes diﬃcult to isolate the eﬀects of each.
To be sure that we meet the convex hull criteria, we check where our country of interest ranks
on various characteristics and omit countries that are on the highest and lowest 5% on various
characteristics.
Finally, in order to look at really signiﬁcant changes, we restrict the case study sample to
countries that have large changes for cluster average ratings for the four CPIA clusters. Now,
we are left with ﬁve countries, Georgia, Maldives, Nigeria, Pakistan and Chad. In Figure 3.1, we
show the various ratings changes associated with each country’s experience in the past 7 years.
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Chad has been beset with a large conﬂict between 2004 and today, and hence its suitability
for a case study of this nature is in doubt. Maldives was hit by the tsunami in 2005, and this
aﬀected its output signiﬁcantly, although there is contention that economic management after
the disaster worsened much more than it should have been if it was merely reacting to disaster
relief. Nigeria and Georgia are cases suitable for analysis. However, found from our analysis
that the Georgia case study does not lead to conclusive results due to a lack of robustness of
the synthetic controls method. Because of these issues, we have only included the Nigeria case
in this paper.
3.5 Factor Model
Once we select our cases, we use the synthetic controls procedure to estimate intervention impact.
The synthetic control method we use requires us to set up a factor model that describes how
the outcome variable of interest is determined. Here, we use income per capita as the outcome
variable of interest. There is a large variety of models used in the literature to capture the
important variables that are correlated with income per capita. Instead of wading through
the complete literature, we base our factor model on Levine and Renelt’s (1992) survey on the
sensitivity of cross country regressions.
In their survey, the authors divide independent variables used in cross-country growth regressions
into two groups, variables that are always (or close to always) included in the regressions, and
variables that have been picked and chosen by some researchers while avoided by others. Since
the choice of our factor model is important and yet not as critical to our results as in the case of
traditional regression analysis, we only use the ﬁrst group of variables in our factor model. Such
variables identiﬁed by the authors correspond very closely with the Human Capital-Augmented
Solow Model. The model thus includes variables on population growth, investment, human
capital accumulation, and an initial income variable. We do however add other variables to
perform robustness checks later on.
We understand that there are signiﬁcant weaknesses of this model in explaining economic growth
outcomes. Most obviously, it misses variables that explain improvements in technological inno-
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weaknesses however are not critical to our research because we restrict our donor pool to coun-
tries that are similar to the country in question in the variables that are deemed to be important
in determining growth outcomes, and yet are not included in the regression. Firstly, the donor
pool only includes countries that are either part of an easily designated peer group, or at some
designated distance away from the country in question on policy/institutional framework as
measured by the CPIA ratings. We do this so as to avoid interpolating from countries that have
much stronger/weaker policy/institutional frameworks. Since we are not using the CPIA ratings
in the regression itself, this is an important step in helping us create a strong counterfactual. We
also take out countries with populations much larger or smaller than the country in question, in
order to avoid interpolation from very disparate units.
We believe in this approach because the variables that are included in the regression are used
to create the synthetic control such that the control mimics the treated country well. By re-
stricting the donor pool to countries with similar ratings on policy/institutional structure, we
are controlling for the possibility of other omitted factors biasing our results. Now, assuming
that we can match pre-treatment variables, including both the variables described below and
the outcome variable for a signiﬁcant pre-treatment period, we ought to be fairly conﬁdent of
attributing the impact on growth outcomes to the interventions themselves.
In constructing the model itself, the ﬁrst variable we use is the Private Investment to GDP
ratio. Growth literature has focused heavily on the role of physical capital in adding to per
capita income. The Solow model proscribes a strong role for economic convergence among
nations. Although unconditional convergence is not borne out in reality, the idea that conditional
convergence happens is an accepted one. We thus use initial GDP per capita (as of 1995) as a
proxy for convergence eﬀects.
Recent work on human capital suggests that the role of human capital accumulation in growth
is very signiﬁcant. Eﬀorts to turn the abstract concept of human capital into an operational
variable have been fraught with data limitations and much criticism. We opt for the best possible
measure, which is the Barro-Lee indicator of the average years of secondary schooling for people
above 15 years. We pick this indicator over the enrollment variable, gross % of secondary school
enrollment among the population in the age range appropriate for such enrollment when it is
available. This is because the growth process today stems from the abilities of the work force
today, rather than from the enrollment of the labor force of tomorrow. We take into account the
lines of criticism that there are nonlinearities in the returns to schooling, based on the year of
schooling and the quality of the education. Even so, the lack of measures that take into account
these issues forces us to use the admittedly imperfect human capital measure.
Finally, we include the population growth rate as well. Now, we are ready to run empirical case
studies in order to assess Nigeria and Georgia’s reform performance. One ﬁnal caveat is in order
however. Even if the results of this analysis show that a country’s performance is not much
stronger than the counterfactual unit, the takeaway is not that these reforms were unwarranted,
or inadvisable. These reforms might be more important towards sustaining income growth than
accelerating them, in which case, we might see no eﬀect of reforms in the short post-intervention
period. The analysis does however help us assess the performance of reforms to date in a clearer
manner.
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Nigeria’s March towards Stronger
Economic Management
4.1 Nigeria before the Reforms
Nigeria has long been famous for its large development potential, rich natural resources and an
ultimately tragic set of outcomes due to mis-governance and conﬂicts. With a population of
more than 100 million, and proven oil reserves of 36.2 billion barrels, it appears to have the
strongest economic potential of all African States. However, in 2000, Nigeria had a GNP per
capita of US$300, lower than the per capita income during 1960, the year of independence. In
2000, 66% of the population lived in below the dollar-a-day poverty line. It is in this context
that General Abacha died in 1998 and a democratically elected government assumed power in
May 1999.
During the post-independence period, Nigeria had suﬀered through chronic economic misman-
agement and corruption. The discovery of petroleum had manifested itself as a tragic resource
curse by obliterating non-oil exports as well as creating rent-seeking governance behavior on the
part of the political elite. In the 1990s, the World Bank lamented that stronger price of oil had
continuously led to wasteful spending by the government. When the oil price fell in 1998-99,
lack of oil receipts led to a threat of current account crisis. As late as 2002, the IMF was stating
that 2001-02 were marked by large macro imbalances, with a large ﬁscal and current account
deﬁcit. Large government spending in the face of oil price booms was seen as the culprit for
such ﬁscal mismanagement.
Monetary policy was tightened in 2002, which stemmed the tide of inﬂation. The 2002 IMF
consultation document states that the government had started controlling the budget in 2002,
and yet further improvement was warranted. By September 2002, foreign exchange reserves
had fallen to around $7 billion. During this period, the IMF noted that progress on structural
reform, including on trade barriers had not moved ahead. It is also notable the CPIA ratings
for debt policy in Nigeria during the period of 1999-2001 were the weakest, with Nigeria getting
a 1, the lowest rating score for external debt management.
Poverty in Nigeria had always been a major concern, and the 2003/04 living standards mea-
surement survey showed that 54% of the population was living below the 1 dollar a day poverty
line.
164.2 Nigeria’s Reforms since 2003
Nigeria consistently improved its ratings for the economic management and structural policies
clusters between 2003 and 2009. Nigeria’s debt policy rating rose by 2 points from 2003 to 2009.
Similarly, its trade policy rating rose by 1.5 points as well. The average rating for its economic
management cluster went up by more than a point, while the average rating for structural policies
rose by a point as well. The social inclusion and public governance clusters, however, have not
seen any signiﬁcant ratings changes.
Nigeria came up with the NEEDS (the National Economic Empowerment and Development
Strategy) in 2004. This included reforms such as passage of a ﬁscal responsibility bill. Also
introduced was the idea of a reference oil price, which was to guide ﬁscal decisions. The IMF saw
NEEDS as a major ﬁrst step towards a credible agenda of growth and poverty reduction. In the
2005 report, the IMF and IDA staﬀ saw implantation of the strategy in 2004-05 as "impressive".
In the 2007 progress report, the IMF staﬀ state that macroeconomic policies improved, while
there was still worry regarding ﬁscal expansion and quality of budget spending.
On other fronts, the NEEDS strategy included reforms on ﬁnancial sector, transport system,
accountability and transparency. The passing of the bill on Commitment to Extractive Industries
Transparency Initiative, and the start of civil society involvement through the "Publish what you
Pay" initiative meant that oil revenue data would be collected and published. Further promises
on health, education and poverty eradication were made as well. That said however, the CPIA
ratings show that WB analysts did not believe signiﬁcant progress in these sectors were made,
unlike in economic management and structural policies cluster.
The ﬁnancial sector reforms in 2004 also forced consolidation in the banking sector by raising
the minimum capital requirements by a ten-fold. This led to signiﬁcant banking mergers and
consolidation. The government also replaced a pay-as-you-go system with a fully funded pension
system. After these reforms, domestic credit to GDP ratios have risen from around 13% in 2002-
2006 to above 25% in 2007 and later. This large rise in ﬁnancial deepening is impressive.
4.3 Nigeria’s Growth Performance post-reforms
Nigeria’s GDP per capita (PPP at constant prices) in 2004 was 1687, which rose by 15.7% to
2000.78 in ﬁve years. Generally, this would be attributed to the eﬀect of oil. Worldwide oil
prices, as measured weekly weighted spot price, have risen from 20 dollars per barrel in early
2003 to 71.75 dollars per barrel at the end of 2009. This has led to a sharp rise in Nigeria’s
state expenditures and these expenditures have been distributed, albeit imperfectly to parts of
the population, thus raising mean income. This narrative however does not tell Nigeria’s story
completely. While oil prices surged between 2003 and 2009, Nigeria’s Real non-oil GDP actually
rose by 13.2% in 2004, by 8.6% in 2005, and by an average of 9.3% during 2003-2007.
Whether the additional spending created by revenue windfall through oil spurred the rest of the
economy is diﬃcult to answer, but the data reveals that government expenditure to GDP ratio
has gone down since 2001. In 2001, the ratio was 51%. As oil prices jumped in 2003 and kept
on rising for the rest of the decade, the ratio declined to around 30% between 2003 and 2007.
The ﬁscal rule has been applied well, as the excess crude account that houses excess oil revenue
amounted to $18 billion in late 2008. Given that the majority of the oil revenue goes to the
government and government expenditures have been tightened, it is hard to suggest that most
of the economic growth indirectly from oil revenue.
If oil is not the only driver of growth, we need to investigate what is. Analysts believe that
much of this growth came from accumulation rather than productivity increases. Interestingly,
agriculture contributed around 40-45% of the growth during the 2003-2008 period. The impact
of private remittances has been signiﬁcant in the second half the decade. Remittances have
jumped from $1.06 billion in 2003 to $9.98 billion in 2008, which amounts to around 12% of real
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(often they are ways in which people in countries with large conﬂicts or weak policy ﬁght for the
economic survival of their families), the impressive performance in FDI ﬁgures tell a diﬀerent
story. FDI rose from $2.85 billion in 2003 to $6.42 billion in 2007. These ﬁgures suggest that
foreign investment into Nigeria had increased signiﬁcantly, thus strengthening the notion that
the business environment, at least for foreign investors, has become friendlier.
Although this growth performance looks strong at face value, we need to create a suitable
comparator unit in order to really understand whether Nigeria’s growth record is extraordinary
or not. The critical question at hand is; had the reforms during 2001-2004 not happened, how
would Nigeria have grown till date? We attempt this exercise next.
4.4 Running Synthetic Controls
The synthetic controls procedure for Nigeria creates a synthetic control where countries with a
positive weight on the control are Bolivia, Tajikistan and Zambia. Table 4.1 shows the nations
with their weights.





The method works well in creating a synthetic unit that matches Nigeria in its pre-GDP trends
before between 1995 and 2004. The RMSPE is 12.53, and as Table 4.2 shows, the characteristics
of the synthetic unit are very similar to Nigeria between 1995 and 2003. There is one caveat.
The investment rate diﬀers between the synthetic and the real unit. When we look qualitatively
at the two countries that have signiﬁcant weights in the synthetic control unit, we can see that
both Zambia and Bolivia are economies with strong natural resource bases. Zambia is well know
for its copper exports, and the price of copper has increased in the post-intervention period,
similar to the price of oil. Similarly, Bolivia is well known for natural gas, and energy prices
have risen all around. As a further check, none of the two countries have had conﬂicts. While
this period has coincided with Evo Morales’ rule in Bolivia, the economy has hummed along
due to the rising price of commodities in the international market. Finally neither of the two
countries are Nigeria’s largest trading partners, which helps us believe in the non-interference
assumption.
Table 4.2: Predictor Balance
Variables Treated Synthetic
Population Growth Rate 2.44 2.50
Secondary School Enrollment Ratio 26.15 36.62
Investment Rate 2.79 11.41
Initial GDP per capita 1414.9 1404.9
Figure 4.1 below shows the GDP per capita trends for Nigeria and the Synthetic control unit.
The synthetic control unit trends are the counterfactuals which show us how Nigeria would have
performed if not for the reforms in 2003-04.
18Figure 4.1: Nigeria against its Synthetic Control Unit
As we can see from Figure 4.1, Nigeria’s economic growth performance has been stronger than
that of its synthetic control between 2003 and 2009. This analysis suggests that had the reforms
not happened in Nigeria during the 2003-2004 period, the country would have a GDP per capita
of 1821 instead of 2000.77 in 2009. While this does not seem to be a huge gap, it is an increase
of 10%, which is a large diﬀerence given the short post-reform period.
4.5 Placebo Tests
The synthetic controls method uses aggregate data, and is not making statements about the
general relationship between the variables of interest among the unit (country) space. That
said however, there is uncertainty about the ability of the control unit to truly mimic the coun-
terfactual economic path of Nigeria. Abadie et. al. operationalize this concept of uncertainty
by running placebo tests, where similar synthetic control procedures are run for all the other
countries in the donor pool. This allows the researcher to see whether the eﬀect seen in Nigeria
is large relative to the eﬀect seen for randomly chosen countries in the donor pool. (Abadie et
al, 2007) We perform such tests for Nigeria.
The results of the placebo tests are shown in Figure 4.2, which shows the real-synthetic gap
between the Income per capita trends for Nigeria against the rest of the donor pool group. We
also exclude countries with a RMSPE greater than 5 times the RMSPE of Nigeria.
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This shows that among countries with strong synthetic controls in the donor pool, Nigeria’s
growth performance is one of the strongest. There are only two countries with a much stronger
performance than Nigeria in the donor pool. This deﬁnitely suggests that the reforms have
heralded a strong performance in average income per capita in Nigeria between 2003 and 2009.
4.6 Robustness Checks
A large criticism against the cross-country regression literature is the fact that when the variables
used in the regression are changed, the estimates of the eﬀects change as well. Given that there
is not one guideline on the choice of variables, we attempt to test whether the synthetic controls
procedure we are using is more robust to similar criticism in the particular case of Nigeria. We
run robustness checks by including ﬁve other variables to the factor model. We then compare
our results across each permutation with our initial result. If the results of various permutations
are very diﬀerent from the initial model, then the model does not display strong robustness. The
ﬁve variables we choose are the following; sectoral shares of GDP for agriculture and industry,
M2 deposits to GDP as a proxy for ﬁnancial deepening, ratio of trade to GDP as a proxy for
openness, and oil rents to GDP ratio. Table 4.3 shows the permutation of our robustness tests
in more detail.
Table 4.3: Permutations for Robustness Check
Permutations Variables Included
Initial Population Growth, Initial GDP per capita, Human Capital Proxy, Investment to GDP Ratio
2 Initial Variables + Agriculture Share of GDP + Industry Share of GDP
3 Permutation 2 + Oil Rents to GDP Ratio
4 Permutation 3 + M2 to GDP Ratio
5 Permutation 4 + Trade to GDP Ratio
When we run these checks for Nigeria, we ﬁnd that in all permutations, the results are very
similar to results with the initial model. Permutation 5 achieves a slightly lower RMSPE of
11.89, and yet both the weights on comparator units and post-intervention income growth trend
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models, which is a sign of robustness of the methodology in this particular case. Overall, we see
that Nigeria has performed better than its best comparison unit since 2003.
4.7 Beyond Average Income Per Capita
There are strong limitations with conﬂating development as synonymous to growth in average
income per capita. Firstly, average incomes can rise alongside a large rise in inequality, where
the median citizen is no better oﬀ, while the country earns plaudits for its performance. To
avoid such intellectual traps, we attempt to look at changes in median household income, but
are beset by data problems. The lack of Gini coeﬃcient values also hinders us in this regard.
The lack of data on inequality and median income makes it hard to analyze whether the mean
income data is dominated by outliers.
We also attempt to delve into other development outcomes to ﬁnd out if the increase in average
income per capita is an indicator of broad based development or a statistical anomaly. Nigeria
has achieved some success in the past decade, as the adult literacy rate, and the enrollment into
education ratio have both gone up signiﬁcantly. The country has seen a rise in its HDI value
from 0.4 in 2005 to 0.419 in 2009, which is again not a large, yet a positive change. The life
expectancy has crept up slowly between 2000 and 2010. This means that ultimately, the rise
in economic growth may have not had impact on other important development outcomes and
yet we do not have a simple way of testing such a story. Even with such caveats, we can safely




In cases where robustness is strong, the synthetic control method helps us clearly assess the im-
pact of reforms, such as the strong positive impact of Nigeria’s reforms on its growth performance
since 2003. In such cases, this method has a stronger claim to causal inference than traditional
regression methods. The use of synthetic control methods in evaluation of large scale reforms
would thus be a welcome step towards adding more rigor in the reform evaluation process.
The case of Nigeria shows there are instances where strong economic performance can be at-
tributed with much certainty to reforms on macroeconomic, debt and ﬁnancial policy. While the
Georgia case is not included in the paper, it illuminated the natural advantage of the framework
we are using. The fact that the method itself shows its suitability for certain cases means it can
be used only for cases where it shows robust results. Unlike a cross-country regression frame-
work, the researcher knows when the method is working well or not, hence avoiding a false sense
of accuracy. Finally, this still leaves questions about the suitability of this method to understand
impact of governance reforms, as these variables are slower moving.
Overall, this method shows that in the speciﬁc case of Nigeria, the country beneﬁted largely
from its reforms in the mid-2000s. Nigeria’s reforms have marshalled increased incomes and
investment compared to the best comparison unit. Critically, our qualitative research also agrees
with this ﬁnding. We however, still do not know much about and how exactly the reforms worked.
Learning more about the success of Nigeria’s reforms should now be done in conjunction with
micro-level studies that utilize stronger identiﬁcation techniques and more rigorous evaluation
design that are only possible with data on a micro-scale.
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